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Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden once famously 
threatened that his agency would pursue wrongdoing corporate 
executives so as to leave them "naked, homeless and without 
wheels."l Yet it has not always been so clear that executives are the 
primary focus of securities enforcement in financial misreporting 
cases, even when they are its main architects. Their companies 
often seem to be the real targets. In reports about private securities 
litigation, settlements (and the rare judgments after trial) in fraud-
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. Thanks to Bill Bratton, Hillary Sale, Larry Hamermesh, Donna 
Nagy, Mark Kreitman, and faculty and students in presentations at 
Georgetown, Fordham, and the University of Connecticut Insurance Law 
Symposium for helpful comments; to David Becker for helping me with the title 
quote; and to Aslynn Johnson and John Huffman for excellent research 
assistance. 
1. Meyer Eisenberg, Enforcement Issues and Litigation, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 
421, 421-22 (1994). The reference was to pursuing insider traders, 
but has taken on a broader connotation in SEC lore. See id.; SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM'N, ROUNDTABLE OF SEC CHAIRMEN 12-13 (2004), 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oralHistories/roundtables/SECChairmen/ 
chairmen_060204Transcript. pdf. 
627 
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on-the-market lawsuits are almost always paid directly by the 
company or out of its directors' and officers' ("D&O") insurance 
coverage, for which the company pays the premiums, rather than by 
the officers or directors charged with the fraud.2 In SEC 
enforcement actions, headlines frequently tell about the heavy civil 
penalties imposed on issuers. To be sure, there have been 
noteworthy criminal prosecutions of individual executives3 and well-
publicized individual settlements in a few private class actions.4 
Since 2002 especially, the SEC has clearly been more aggressive in 
seeking remedies against individual executives, and even companies 
themselves appear more willing to try to recoup payments they have 
made to dishonest managers.5 But it is still too early to say whether 
there really has been a shift in emphasis, much less a coherent 
policy behind the "company versus individuals" decision when 
sanctioning corporate fraud. 6 
To academics, the appropriate role of enterprise liability in 
securities litigation is hardly a new issue-it has been debated at 
2. For a now somewhat-dated study, see FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL., 
NERA REPORT-RECENT TRENDS III: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS? 9 (1995) (concluding that 68.2% of settlements are 
paid from insurers, 31.4% from the company, and only 0.4% from individual 
defendants). There have been some recent cases with large contributions by 
major company executives (often controlling shareholders), but these seem to be 
limited to situations where the company is insolvent and the insider is under 
indictment, so that contributing to the settlement fund may largely be an effort 
to gain leniency. See John C. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An 
Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534,1551-53 
(2006). A good example of the standard practice is the Cendant litigation, 
which prior to Enron and Worldcom was the largest securities fraud settlement. 
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001). The company paid 
$2.85 billion of the $3.18 billion settlement, with no individual contribution. Id. 
at 288. An attack on the fairness of the settlement was rejected. Id. at 292-
293; see Coffee, supra, at 1568. 
3. See Kathleen Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397,420-33 (2006). 
4. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1551. 
5. These efforts are difficult, however. See Phred Dvorak & Serena Ng, 
Check, Please: Reclaiming Pay from Executives is Tough to Do, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
20, 2006, at AI; Joann Lublin & Scott Thurm, How to Fire a CEO: More Bosses 
Are Getting the Boot, But It's Harder to Sack Them Without Paying for the 
Privilege, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2006, at Bl, B3. 
6. A study by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin indicates that from a review of 
cases brought from 1978 to 2006, some $1.8 billion in fines was assessed against 
senior executives in financial misreporting cases, along with some $8.64 billion 
in disgorgement. Jonathan M. Karpoff et aI., The Consequences to Managers for 
Financial Misrepresentation, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 32, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972607).This 
shows a considerable targeting of individuals, but probably nowhere near the 
level of aggregate gain from such misconduct. Individual executives also suffer 
in other ways, including a high probability of job loss and drop in stock value of 
their securities holdings. 
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length for some time.7 What is most notable is how many scholars 
from across the ideological spectrum have now joined the doubters of 
enterprise liability, at least with respect to private securities 
litigation.s For some time, critics of private securities litigation were 
concerned almost exclusively with the potential for strike suits, 
painting class actions as a form of plaintiffs' lawyer-driven 
extortion, regardless of at whom they were targeted.9 That 
argument, though expressing a legitimate concern,1O was probably 
overstated, and the reforms proposed as a result of it threatened 
good private lawsuits as well as bad ones.ll But this debate 
obscured deeper questions of whether and how much investors 
really benefit, even from meritorious cases, given how the litigation 
system is currently structured. Much of this relates to the centrality 
of enterprise liability, which effectively causes some investors to 
shoulder the lawsuits' burdens while others receive payouts. The 
SEC, too, has shifted with respect to its enforcement actions, 
recently acknowledging that the justification for enterprise liability 
in the form of civil penalties against corporate defendants is not self-
evident, and thus adopting a new policy for deciding whether the 
company itself will be penalized at all. 12 
7. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class 
Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1504 (1996); Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, 
Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theories and Evidence, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691,692 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages 
for Open Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 653-57 (1996); Adam 
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 947-59 (1999). 
The issue is, of course, important beyond securities litigation. E.g., Alan Sykes, 
The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1278-80 (1984). 
8. For the most recent contributions to the literature, see Coffee, supra 
note 2, at 1561-66; Larry Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 137, 143-47 (2006); Richard Booth, Who Should Recover What 
for Securities Fraud? 30 (Univ. Md. School of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2005-32, 2005), available at 
http://www.ssrn.comlabstract=683197 . 
9. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and 
Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1489, 1490-93 (2006); see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1536 n.5. 
10. For a good overview of the evidence, see Choi & Thompson, supra note 
9, at 1490-93; Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1469-74 (2004). 
11. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions 
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 523-24 (1997); Elliot Weiss & Janet Moser, 
Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch·22 that the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457,458-60 (1998). 
Many commentators who believe that securities fraud requires aggressive 
deterrence were thus led to oppose reform. 
12. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [hereinafter SEC Statementl. The 
debate also occurs in the criminal context, where many have discussed whether 
corporate criminal liability: plays a useful role. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, No 
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All of this is interesting and important, though background for 
my main interest in this Article. To the extent that we were to shift 
away from our current emphasis on corporate liability, are we 
satisfied with the available tools for going after the executives who 
were complicit in the fraud? After all, enterprise liability evolved as 
a solution to the problems associated with sanctioning individuals. 
Now that we have more doubts about the efficacy of that solution, 
we should revisit the law and theory of individual liability to see if 
there are changes we should make there. 
My view is that enterprise liability can and should be pared 
back, but that the legitimacy of the underlying policy requires that 
we see to it that executives who are responsible for corporate fraud 
or misreporting at the very least forfeit most or all of the immense 
wealth obtained as a result of their control over the firm during the 
time of the wrongdoing. Hence, my attention in this Article is on 
equitable remedies-especially rescission and restitution-as 
underutilized tools in securities fraud enforcement. As we shall see, 
equitable remedies have the appeal (from the plaintiffs or enforcer's 
perspective, at least) of making a culpable state of mind-i.e., 
scienter-far less important, thereby easing what is almost always 
the moving party's heaviest evidentiary burden. When there is real 
culpability, a predictable penalty on top of that as a deterrent would 
be good, too, although we must be wary of being too punitive with 
respect to managers who acted in good faith in trying to benefit the 
company and its shareholders .. The line between fraud and savvy 
competitive behavior (or poor judgment) is a blurry one in a business 
world hardly characterized by confessional candor. 13 This Article 
takes inventory of current law to see how close to the restitutionary 
objective we are and what changes might be helpful. 
Dishonest executives are undoubtedly subject to serious 
sanction; the question is only how and by whom those executives are 
sanctioned. There are many potential sources of sanction: federal 
and state, civil and criminal, private and public, or legal and extra-
legal. 14 Even just a survey of these possibilities would be lengthy, 
and that is not the goal of my Article. Instead, I focus on comparing 
and contrasting two main sources of equitable remedies. One is 
federal securities regulation, via both private and public 
enforcement. As to SEC enforcement, the question is less one of law 
than of will and resources, which leads naturally to the role of 
private lawsuits against officers and other executives as a 
Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 434-48 (1981). 
13. See Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Innovation and the Devolution 
of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1,31-32 (2004); see 
also infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
14. On nonlegal sanctions, see Karpoff, supra note 6, at 32; see also infra 
note 42 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 631 2007
2007] ENTITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY 631 
supplement to the SEC. Here, the problem of executive liability is 
quite interesting and problematic along a number of dimensions. 
The other main source of equitable remedies is state law, 
particularly in Delaware, the leading state of incorporation for large 
firms. It may seem obvious that dishonesty is a form of breach of 
fiduciary duty and that riches tainted by the wrongdoing should 
readily be disgorged under state law. But what if executive 
compensation contracts are written in such a way as to limit the 
circumstances in which the executive can be terminated "for cause" 
and is required to forfeit compensation?15 Or what if the board of 
directors decides, as a matter of business judgment, to settle with 
the executive in a way that seemingly leaves substantial "ill-gotten" 
wealth in the executive's possession? I only want to evaluate the 
state of the law here, and also suggest that how Delaware law 
eventually answers these questions says something about whether 
and how federal law should be redesigned. 
I. BACKGROUND: ENTERPRISE LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
There are, of course, many different forms of executive 
misconduct-commonly, they fall into the categories of breaches of 
care, loyalty, and candor, and may be characterized by various 
states of mind, from malice to simple negligence. Obviously, fraud 
(i.e., intentional or reckless deception) is the most notorious form of 
misconduct. Although fraud fits easily enough into the duty of 
candor category at state law/6 most of the litigation about fraud 
takes place in federal court under the federal securities laws.17 
There are many reasons for this bias toward federal litigation, 
but the strong embrace of enterprise liability at the federallevel18 is 
surely a significant factor. Although there are interesting questions 
beyond the scope of this paper about how well the doctrine of 
respondeat superior fits with the text and structure of the securities 
laws' principal antifraud provision, Rule 10b_5,19 courts have largely 
assumed that when an executive speaks or acts fraudulently within 
the scope of his or her authority and in a manner at least partially 
meant to benefit the corporation, the corporation is jointly and 
severally liable.20 Thus, both private plaintiffs and the SEC 
15. See David Leonhardt, Watch It: If You Cheat, They'll Throw Money, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at Bl. 
16. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,11 (Del. 1998). 
17. See Robert Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections on Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859,909-10 (2003). 
18. Id. at 864. 
19. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and 
Judicially Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat 
Superior Liability Under Section 1O(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1326-32 (1997). 
20. The more difficult question tends to be whether the corporation is liable 
for fraud when the person responsible for the misstatement was not aware of 
the truth but some other corporate employee was, or-even harder-when no 
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commonly name both the company and the potentially responsible 
executives and directors as defendants. 
The controversy is that any financial sanction that is imposed 
on the corporation in a respondeat superior environment is borne in 
the first instance by the company shareholders, whom we generally 
think of as victims, not wrongdoers. This double victimization is not 
inevitably so. There are many cases, such as when fraud permits 
the company to acquire another with overvalued assets, where 
shareholde:-s are clear beneficiaries of the fraud. However, financial 
misreporting usually has at least a partial element of greed or 
foolishness to it so that the shareholder victimization label is often 
apt, leading to concern about the fairness and efficiency of 
enterprise liability. 
The resulting debate focuses on both compensation and 
deterrence. In private litigation, the result of a judgment or 
settlement is that investors who bought or sold during the period of 
the fraud will recover for the losses caused by the revelation of the 
truth.21 In situations where the company itself is not buying or 
selling in the marketplace (as opposed, for example, to a Section 11 
case for a registered public offering under the Securities Act or to 
issuer repurchase activity),22 the investor's loss is not the company's 
gain; instead, other investors pocket the gain. The other investor 
might be an executive in on the conspiracy, making it essentially an 
insider trading case, but it is much more likely that the 
counterparty was simply someone lucky enough to be on the right 
side of the trade. Scholars going back at least to Easterbrook and 
Fischel's classic analysis23 have pointed out that the net social harm 
from corporate fraud, therefore, is much less than is evident at first 
glance because of these offsetting gains to innocent parties, which 
the law makes no effort to take away.24 
That does not mean that the unfortunate victims do not deserve 
compensation. However, if we assume that the company is forced to 
pay that compensation, directly or via the insurance policy it has 
purchased for its officers and directors, then the compensation is 
single corporate employee knew the truth, but their collective knowledge would 
have revealed it. See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 
365 F.3d 353, 363-66 (5th Cir. 2004); Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside 
the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CrN. L. REV. 1187, 
1226-30 (2003). 
21. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005) (analyzing 
the loss causation element of Rule 10b-5 claims following the passage of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act). 
22. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 662-63; Booth, supra note 8, at 20. 
23. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in 
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 651-52 (1985); see also Dennis Karjala, 
A Coherent Approach to Misleading Corporate Announcements, Fraud and Rule 
lOb-5, 52 ALB. L. REV. 957, 963-64 (1988); Paul Mahoney, Precaution Costs and 
the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 628-29 (1992). 
24. Mahoney, supra note 23, at 646-48. 
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largely a form of pocket shifting. 25 Investors find themselves either 
payors or payees (and in some cases both), depending on when they 
bought or sold the company's stock. Research has shown what 
common sense suggests-that the filing of a class action lawsuit 
against a company leads to a drop in the stock price of the company 
separate and distinct from any news it conveys about the 
wrongdoing.26 Current shareholders understand that they will be 
net losers as a result of the suit, both in terms of money paid out 
and legal expenses incurred. 27 
Pocket shifting notwithstanding, compensation still may be 
good policy if the claims of harm are compelling enough. Pocket 
shifting, after all, is the nature of insurance, and society might wish 
to use enterprise liability as an insurance device for investors. Here 
we come to a second point that many commentators have 
emphasized.28 On average, an investor has roughly the same 
likelihood of being the lucky beneficiary of a fraud as its victim. 29 
For diversified, active investors, the gains and losses will thus tend 
to net out over time, meaning that the need for insurance for those 
25. Obviously, this result leaves open the question of whether third 
parties-e.g., accountants, lawyers, investment banks-should be subject to 
suit, since there is less pocket shifting going on there and the case for 
deterrence is stronger. I believe that issuer and third party liability issues 
differ, though there is a case for capping damages in both situations. In 
particular, leaving third parties open to the full measure of damages while 
seeking to protect issuers raises the likelihood that, through indemnification 
provisions or other risk-shifting techniques, the third-parties' liability will 
indirectly be pushed back to the issuer. 
26. See ANJAN THAKOR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 5 (2005); Roberta 
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 55, 67-68 (1991); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News 
in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1435 (1994). On investor 
anticipation of such losses, see Amar Gande & Craig Lewis, Shareholder 
Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry 
Spillovers 5 (Working Paper Series, 2007), available at 
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=891028. Plenty of evidence supports the 
inference that investors as a whole see restraints on private securities litigation 
as useful, not threatening. See, e.g., Marilyn Johnson et aI., In re Silicon 
Graphics, Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 794 (2000); see also Joseph Grundfest & Adam Pritchard, Statutes with 
Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and 
Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 676-77 (2002). 
27. See Johnson et aI., supra note 26, at 802; Gande & Lewis, supra note 
26, at 10. 
28. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 7, at 698-700; Langevoort, supra note 
7, at 648-50; Mahoney, supra note 23, at 635. For an empirical demonstration, 
see ANJAN V. THAKOR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, .THE ECONOMIC 
REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 4 (2005), available at 
http://downloads.heartland.orgl18331.pdf. 
29. The difference reflects trading by the company itself or by insiders with 
knowledge of the fraud. 
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losses lessens. Moreover, if we assume a highly efficient market, the 
residual risk will be priced ex ante,30 so that compensation for the 
average amount of fraud would be built into stock prices. There is 
less need for insurance then, especially if it comes-as it does-with 
high premiums in the form of attorneys' fees and other litigation 
costs borne by shareholders. 
Still, not all investors are active or diversified, and bad luck as a 
result of corporate fraud will predictably befall even some who are, 
in ways that are not washed away. There will always be some 
investors who did rely and suffered losses well in excess of any 
compensation they got outside of litigation. Even here, however, we 
should be cautious. Inactive investors are far more likely not to 
have traded during the class period, but rather to be among those 
company shareholders who simply suffer the costs of the lawsuit 
(many investors who feel aggrieved when the revelation of fraud 
causes a large stock price drop have no standing to sue because they 
bought before the fraud).31 But in the end, therefore, we have to 
admit that there will be some compelling cases where recovery, even 
in an insurance-like system, seems warranted. In the Enron 
litigation,32 for example, much was made of many current and 
former company employees whose retirement savings were heavily 
concentrated in Enron stock.33 Their claim for just compensation 
seems persuasive.34 The question is whether, even for this 
remaining group, the insurance "product" created by private 
litigation-driven enterprise liability is a particularly attractive one. 
30. I am skeptical that market prices decrease the risk of fraud in a careful 
fashion, though there is no doubt that the risk premium does reflect, in part, 
the fear of deception. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Animal Spirits-
of the Stock Market: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 135, 182-83 (2002). My guess is that this varies widely based on 
investor sentiment. 
31. And it is quite possible that much of the public support for private 
securities litigation comes as a result of the erroneous assumption that the law 
does compensate all these victims. An interesting feature of the litigation 
landscape is how often institutional investors do not even bother to collect the 
money owed to them as a result of settlements, which says something-
although it is not clear exactly what-about how institutions view the need for 
compensation. See James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Letting Billions Slip 
Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the 
Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action 
Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412-13 (2005). 
32. See generally In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 284 
F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (denying in part a motion to dismiss claims 
brought by participants in three employee pension plans under ERISA for a 
breach of fiduciary duty against their employer). 
33. Id. at 555-59. 
34. One problem with this, however, is moral hazard: as a matter of policy, 
investors should diversify and be careful-it thus seems counterintuitive to give 
compensatory priority to those who are not. See David Hoffman, The "Duty" to 
be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 548-49 (2005). 
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It delivers at best only five to ten cents per dollar of alleged losses 
(often less), compensates far too many investors who do not have the 
same claim to compensation, and comes at a very high price tag that 
eats up fifteen to thirty percent of the claims in plaintiffs' legal fees 
and costs plus arguably even more in indirect costs (particularly 
defendants' legal fees and costS).35 Were this sold as an insurance 
product, consumer-protection advocates might well seek to have it 
banned as abusive because the hidden costs are so large. Conceding 
that some mechanism should exist to compensate these sufferers, it 
is far from clear that the appropriate mechanism is the current 
system. 
The foregoing argument is commonly met with the response 
that whatever its defects as a compensatory device, private 
securities litigation effectively deters securities fraud. 36 From a 
deterrence standpoint, enterprise liability is attractive because 
responsibility for fraud is often diffused among many participants.37 
The threat of enterprise liability essentially instructs the firm to 
take precautions (selection of managers, design of incentives, 
internal controls, etc.) to reduce the system-wide fraud risk. It also 
permits a more risk-neutral entity to assume this task, as opposed 
to risk-fearing individual executives who might thus be excessively 
t . 38 cau lOUS. 
The problem is that executives themselves will not be deterred 
from misconduct when their personal gain from perpetrating or 
concealing the fraud exceeds the impact they would suffer should 
the corporation have to pay. As Arlen and Carney have shown, a 
sizable portion of corporate fraud comes when executives fear that 
discovery of the truth will cost them their jobs, reputations, and 
perquisites, and thus have a strong incentive to delay discovery so 
that they can remain in control longer and hope for some good 
fortune that will turn things around.39 Even if much of this is also 
intended to benefit the company (e.g., keeping creditors or 
customers from exiting in a way that would harm the company or 
even threaten its survival), the rational response is to take the risk 
of some future lawsuit rather than bring on certain immediate 
harm. Psychologically, the tendency of corporate executives (and 
corporate cultures) to be overconfident about their chances of 
avoiding harm only increases the likelihood of their misrepresenting 
35. See generally In re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 
538 (S.D. N.Y. 2004). 
36. See Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class Action 
Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365, 365 (2006). 
37. See Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of 
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 866-67 (1984). 
38. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be 
Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 
13 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 239 passim (1993). 
39. Arlen & Carney, supra note 7, at 694. 
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the truth.40 
An alternative deterrence story is that, while executives might 
well be subject to temptation or cognitive bias, outside directors will 
not, and they will insist on rigorous monitoring and internal controls 
to avoid large-scale enterprise liability.41 There are two main 
responses here. One is that the company clearly suffers from the 
marketplace discovery of the fraud at a level substantially in excess 
of even the most sizable fines. 42 If the directors are sufficiently 
motivated, this reputational exposure (without the need for 
additional legal penalty) would seem to be ample to put them to 
work.43 The other response is that the assumption of sufficiently 
motivated and knowledgeable outside directors is questionable, at 
least historically. 44 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was essentially 
a response to the perceived inadequacy of "gatekeeper" involvement 
of the sort provided by outside directors on audit committees, 
notwithstanding decades of enterprise liability risk.45 There are 
open questions about whether Sarbanes-Oxley will create the 
necessary incentives.46 If it does, then the deterrence-based 
argument for private litigation enterprise liability exposure 
weakens; if not, then it may just prove the futility of the effort. One 
might argue that enterprise liability plus Sarbanes-Oxley's 
enhancements offer the right mix, and we cannot rule that out 
entirely. But it is still a speculative case, suggesting caution before 
embracing the expensive current system. My prediction would be 
that enterprise liability's deterrence value actually is positive, but 
not all that large when other influences on director behavior are 
considered. That, however, brings us back to the same point made 
earlier about compensation: because the current private litigation 
system is so cumbersome and expensive, it may be hard to justify 
under its current design even if it does produce some benefits, giving 
40. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of 
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social 
Harm), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139-41 (1997). 
41. To this we should add other company executives not in on the fraud, 
but in a position to blow the whistle on it. 
42. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et aI., The Costs to Firms of Cooking the 
Books, J FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-2, 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=652121.This includes a 
reputational penalty above and beyond either the value-relevance of the 
revealed information or the effects of lawsuits and government enforcement. 
Id. 
43. For the portion of actions viewed by the market as meritorious, 
directors themselves pay a reputational penalty. See Helland, supra note 36, at 
366. 
44. Sanjai Bhagat et aI., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and 
Management Turnover, 54 Bus. LAw. 885, 887-89 (1999). 
45. E.g., Jill Fisch & Caroline Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance 
Committee: Using Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 
53 DUKE L.J. 517, 519-20 (2003). 
46. Id. at 566-82. 
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us reason to look for something better. 
The enterprise liability debate is not limited to private 
securities litigation. Under prodding from two of its commissioners, 
the SEC issued a policy statement in January 2006 describing how 
it will decide whether to seek fines against the company as opposed 
(or in addition) to the individual wrongdoers,47 acknowledging that 
large fines against companies-notwithstanding their publicity 
value for the SEC's enforcement program-may sometimes hurt 
investors more than help them. The SEC's policy statement lists a 
disparate group of factors that will be considered.48 The principal 
factor is whether the company benefited from the violation, which 
the Commission describes in terms of a desire to avoid unjust 
enrichment.49 That point is well taken, though if such benefit can 
actually be demonstrated, then disgorgement, as opposed to a 
penalty, would seem to be the natural move. 
That issue brings up an intriguing conceptual question about 
the SEC's approach-should the right standard be actual benefit, or 
instead, whether the perpetrators intended to benefit the company 
(at least in part) by their conduct? The latter standard is the one 
used in agency law (respondeat superior)50 and works from the 
following logic. If managers engage in some risky course of 
deceptive conduct meant to benefit the company and it succeeds, the 
shareholders are enriched and keep the gains. Assume now that the 
scheme fails, either because the bet did not payoff or because the 
deception was exposed, so that no actual benefits were generated. 
In terms of deterrence, one would presumably want to penalize the 
company then as well, lest the shareholders be left with the gains 
when the deception succeeds but no penalty when it fails. 
Buying into that idea, however, creates fairly broad corporate 
liability exposure because, as noted earlier, most financial reporting 
frauds (certainly Enron and Worldcom, for instance) are intended to 
benefit the company and its shareholders, at least in part.51 The 
question is whether we really expect good deterrence as a result of a 
47. SEC Statement, supra note 12; see Ralph Ferrara et aI., The SEC's 
Newly Announced Standards for the Imposition of Corporate Monetary 
Penalties: An Overdue Step Toward Predictability, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 
170, at 170 (Jan. 30, 2006) (suggesting that the SEC's approach should apply to 
how big the corporate fine is, as well as to whether there is a fine in the first 
place). 
48. SEC Statement, supra note 12. 
49. Id. 
50. Peri Nielson & Claudia Mann, Securities Enforcement: Company 
Liability After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 INSIGHTS 1, 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.wsgr.comIPDFSearchlInsights 1004Nielsen. pdf. 
51. See Langevoort, Technological Innovation, supra note 13, at 10; Baruch 
Lev, Corporate Earnings Management: Fact or Fiction?, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 27, 36 (2003). This is not to say that greed does not playa role as 
well. Note that if greed is the only motivation, then traditional respondeat 
superior principles would say that there is no vicarious liability at all. 
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threat like this, which brings us back to our earlier discussion. The 
Commission's choice of an actual benefit, rather than an "intent to 
benefit" standard,52 presumably reflects some doubts about 
respondeat superior theory as a deterrent device. If so, then it 
really might just be a redundancy for disgorgement, perhaps just 
. seeking to avoid the need to prove the actual amount of the benefit 
as is required when disgorgement is sought in court. 
On the other hand, the Commission expands the corporate 
penalty threat by making difficulty of detection, scope of the fraud, 
and the "need to deter" the type of offense additional factors in the 
analysis.53 It is hard to see how or why these should be important 
factors if we think that shareholder liability generally produces little 
deterrence in the first place. Conversely, if we have more faith in 
the deterrence possibility, then the Commission's choice of the 
actual benefit standard is open to criticism, especially if that is the 
dominating factor. 
Other factors on the list turn to compensation, insofar as the 
"fair funds" provision of Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC to find the 
victims of the fraud and use both disgorgement and penalty 
amounts to distribute fair shares in compensation.54 This provision 
is a useful item to consider, but is limited in two respects. First, as 
noted earlier, the theory behind identifying who is injured by fraud 
is hard-are active, sophisticated traders to be put in the same place 
as undiversified retail investors (in which case, institutional 
investors get the overwhelming amount of the fair funds proceeds)? 
If not, how are the priorities to be set? Second, there is the problem 
of identifying the tens of thousands of potential victims and 
assessing their claims, which is a very costly process and one likely 
to eat up a large portion of the amount to be distributed unless very 
arbitrary determinations are made.55 The Commission obscures all 
of these practical issues by simply saying that the desire to 
compensate victims will be part of the corporate penalty 
determination. 
A final cluster of factors on the SEC's list looks at whether the 
company behaved appropriately after discovering the problem, i.e., 
remediation and cooperation with the Commission and other 
enforcers. 56 This consideration is important, but is meant at least 
partly as a hammer vis-a-vis the board of directors, and is 
controversial as a result. 57 If directors let company officials and 
52. SEC Statement, supra note 12. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT No. 05-760, SEC AND CFTC 
PENALTIES: CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN COLLECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER 
SEC MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED 11 (2005). 
56. SEC Statement, supra note 12. 
57. Robert S. Bennett et ai., Internal Investigations and the Defense of 
Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 Bus. LAw. 55, 80-83 (2006). 
HeinOnline -- 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 639 2007
2007] ENTITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY 639 
their lawyers fight the SEC's claims against the executives too hard, 
their decision may lead directly to a corporate penalty. But 
sometimes the SEC is wrong in its suspicions, so that a vigorous 
corporate-funded defense of (and by) company executives is 
. t'fi d 58 JUs I Ie . 
My sense, then, is that the SEC's 2006 policy statement is born 
of the same conceptual difficulties that we struggle with in the 
private securities litigation area. It is a good starting point for 
constructive deliberation, but highly indeterminate and 
unsatisfying. Both the deterrence and compensatory questions 
embedded in the guidelines are more difficult than they seem at first 
glance, and there really are no obvious rules of thumb for when 
sanctioning the corporation is good policy in the absence of better-
grounded assumptions about deterrence and compensation. 
II. A SECOND LOOK AT INDIVIDUAL EXECUTIVE LIABILITY 
The preceding discussion of the problems associated with 
enterprise liability takes us to the obvious question: how much could 
we gain by diminishing the liability threat to the corporation and its 
shareholders, and instead making it so that the individual 
executives who participated in the fraud are the primary, and 
maybe only, targets? If we do so, do we also need to improve the 
legal framework for individual liability? 
With respect to private securities litigation, these questions 
have been obscured because of the impression that individual 
liability could never support full (Le., often multi-billion dollar) 
compensation for the fraud's victims. Thus, enterprise liability is a 
practical "deep pocket" necessity on compensatory grounds, 
whatever its conceptual flaws. But as we have seen, the 
compensatory case, though strong in certain instances, is weaker 
than assumed. It does not require the inflated liability exposure 
created by the current fraud-on-the-market system and could be 
aided considerably by prioritizing distributions to those more 
deserving than others. Once we shift primary attention to 
deterrence, the amount of liability exposure could be a good bit 
smaller and presumably still have a sharp bite, so long as it is well-
targeted. The remainder of this Article will address whether this 
shift is practicable. 
58. This was the basis for Judge Kaplan's decision in United States v. Stein, 
435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), criticizing prosecutors for 
pressuring the company not to advance expenses to executives, by using the 
leverage of threatened prosecution of the corporation. Recently, the 
Department of Justice has revised its policies on this aspect of cooperation via 
the so-called "McNulty" Memo. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty on 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to the United 
States Attorneys, Department of Justice 19 (Feb. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speechl2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
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The next step in the analysis is to look at the existing legal 
regime with respect to individual liability to assess its current 
status and future potential. Most discussions treat fraud-based 
liability, whether enterprise or individual, as a federal securities law 
issue.59 But this is not necessarily so. Intra-corporate fraud and 
breaches of the duty of candor vis-Ii-vis company stockholders create 
state corporate law liability as well (and often state securities law 
liability), and some federal courts have suggested that state law 
ought to have primacy with respect to those frauds that are 
essentially instances of corporate mismanagement.6o So, perhaps 
the better place to start in assessing executive liability exposure is 
with respect to state law, particularly that of Delaware. 
III. STATE LAw ON EXECUTIVE LIABILITY 
There are two versions of executive "dishonesty" to consider, 
and one is considerably easier than the other. The easier one is 
when an executive is actively involved in creating material 
misimpressions on the part of the board or company shareholders, or 
fails to speak when there is a duty to do SO.61 If deliberate, this can 
easily be seen as a breach of the duties of candor, loyalty, and/or 
good faith. The harder questions arise when the fraudulent scheme 
is designed and executed by subordinates without active 
involvement by the executive. Here, the questions largely turn on 
the executive's state of mind: was there knowing encouragement of 
or acquiescence in the fraud, conscious or reckless disregard, simple 
negligence, or no fault at all? Absent bad faith or something akin to 
gross negligence, this inquiry touches on the legal question of 
whether executives (as opposed to corporate directors) have the full 
protection of the business judgment rule, a topic that has recently 
generated a lively scholarly debate.62 
Let us put aside the hard questions for a moment and assume 
59. Thompson and Sale, supra note 17, at 887,889. 
60. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977); Field v. 
Trump, 850 F.2d 938,947-48 (2d Cir. 1988). For doubts about whether this is a 
useful line to draw, see Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's 
Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
449,463-64 (2001). See also Thompson & Sale, supra note 17, at 863-70. 
61. The latter question is interesting in and of itself, but seems reasonably 
clear (if underutilized) as a matter of state law. See Langevoort, supra note 20, 
at 1199-1205. 
62. Compare Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate 
Officers are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1597, 1642-43 (2005), and 
Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. 
LAw. 439, 440-41 (2005), with Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks 
III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor 
Johnson, 60 Bus. LAw. 865, 865-66, 876 (2005). See also Deborah DeMott, 
Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of Executives' Duties 
(Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies Paper No. 112, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=918524. 
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that a senior executive acted intentionally, deceiving both the board 
and the company shareholders as to the company's financial 
condition in an effort, at least partly, to hold onto his job and 
inflated compensation longer than might have been the case had the 
truth been known. This is bad faith-now, it seems, a breach of 
loyaltl3-and damages are a possibility upon an adequate showing 
of proximate cause, at least in a derivative case. However, an 
equitable remedy may also be well-suited for this kind of case, which 
might be easier for plaintiffs to establish a right to in the first 
instance. The explosion in executive compensation has led to 
massive pay packages tied to performance, in the form of bonuses, 
stock options, and deferred compensation.64 Typically, these 
incentive provisions are tied either to stock price or accounting 
measures, either of which would presumably be tainted by the 
fraud. Isn't there at least a straightforward case for disgorgement of 
all that wealth? 
Black-letter law of contracts and restitution certainly says that 
there is one. Restitution allows recovery of ill-gotten gains against 
those who commit a civil or criminal wrong, in order to avoid unjust 
enrichment.65 In contract terms, a breach of fiduciary duty would 
presumably operate as a material breach of the contract as well, 
giving the victim (the corporation) the right to seek rescission and 
restitution instead of suing on the contract.66 
That much is fairly straightforward. What is often ignored 
about this equitable rescission and restitution option is that it does 
63. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) (noting that a lack of 
good faith will constitute a breach of loyalty when there is a "sustained or 
systematic failure to exercise oversight"). 
64. For a critical view on this compensation explosion, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK 
& JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004). 
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (Tentative Draft No.4, 
2005); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw: RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 
(Tentative Draft No.4, 2005). For a sampling of restitution cases against those 
who did in fact breach their fiduciary duties, see Phansalkar v. Andersen 
Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 197, 211 (2d Cir. 2003) (arguing for an expansive 
scope of compensation that must be disgorged); Aramony v. United Way 
Replacement Benefit Plan, 191 F.3d 140, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1999) (forcing the 
former president and CEO to forfeit salary paid during his period of disloyalty); 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd. v. Malhotra, 131 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961 (N.D. Ill. 
2000) (holding forfeiture of much, but not all, compensation). This issue is also 
analyzed and discussed in Deborah DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007). 
66. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw: RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 38-
39 (Tentative Draft No.3, 2004). There is a debate about whether "restitution" 
after rescission for breach of contract refers to avoiding unjust enrichment on 
the part of the defendant or simply putting the victim back to the status quo 
ante. See Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BuS. LAw. 569, 574-79 
(2006) (describing ALI efforts to make the latter the standard in the new 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT). Even under 
the ALI's approach, unjust enrichment is the standard if the breach was 
opportunistic, which it would be in the case of deliberate deceit. 
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not depend on a showing of intentional or deliberate misconduct by 
the person subject to the disgorgement claim. Suppose, for instance, 
that plaintiffs lack evidence one way or the other on culpability, or 
even that the executive was at most negligent in failing to detect 
and prevent the fraud. As noted, there is a rich debate over the 
protection of the business judgment rule to company executives,67 
from which it might be gleaned that their liability for damages 
depends on a showing of bad faith, disloyalty, or perhaps gross 
negligence. But even when that is so, plaintiffs have a 
restitutionary alternative. 
In In re HealthSouth Corp. Shareholders Litigation, Vice 
Chancellor Strine considered a derivative action seeking rescission 
and restitution with respect to an agreement between then-CEO 
Richard Scrushy and HealthSouth to extinguish a $25 million loan 
that he owed the company.68 The consideration for extinguishing the 
loan was the return of HealthSouth stock of comparable market 
value that he had purchased with the money.69 Soon thereafter, 
accounting irregularities at the company came to light, and the 
market price of the stock dropped precipitously.70 Plaintiffs claimed 
that Scrushy was unjustly enriched by discharging a debt with 
overvalued stock.71 The Vice Chancellor granted their motion for 
. d t 72 summary JU gmen . 
Although there certainly were public allegations of Scrushy's 
involvement in the fraud (though he was later acquitted of criminal 
charges in a widely-publicized and controversial trial),73 plaintiffs in 
the derivative action made no claim of knowledge or intentional 
involvement. Rather, they argued that even if he were uninvolved 
in the wrongdoing, he was still unjustly enriched by benefiting from 
the overvalued stock.74 Vice-Chancellor Strine agreed, finding that 
Scrushy as CEO was "charged with managerial responsibility for 
67. See Johnson, supra note 62, at 453-55. 
68. 845 A.2d 1096, 1100, 1103 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Thorpe v. Cerbco, 
676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996) (noting that even if the fiduciary did not profit at 
the corporation's expense, the profit is still considered unjust enrichment); Hills 
Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 110-11 n.74 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("Even if [the 
defendants] can convince me that they had no role in causing any excessive 
payments to themselves, they still would be unjustly enriched if they received 
them. Just as someone can't keep a mistakenly excessive tax refund or 
automatic teller payout, these defendants cannot hold on to overpayments from 
the company to which they owed fiduciary duties."). For a brief discussion of In 
re HealthSouth, see Mark Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate 
Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 360 n.36 (2004). 
69. HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1100. 
70. Id. at 1100-0l. 
71. Id. at 1103. 
72. Id. at 1110. 
73. Patti Bond, Ex-CEO Scrushy Cleared, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 29, 
2005, atAl. 
74. HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1099. 
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overseeing the preparation of accurate and reliable financial 
statements.,,75 Hence, "[w]hether or not Scrushy breached any 
cognizable duty in signing those statements, he was undoubtedly 
unjustly enriched when the company of which he was a fiduciary 
bought back shares from him at a price inflated by false financial 
statements he had signed.,,76 Strine said that the same conclusion 
could be grounded under the law of innocent misrepresentation (or 
equitable fraud), which is a variant of mutual mistake in contract 
I 77 aw. 
This is a powerful holding when one considers its implications. 
To be sure, at issue was an extraordinary loan transaction (of a kind 
no longer permissible after Sarbanes-Oxley), which made the case 
easier. But suppose that the board of directors had simply awarded 
Scrushy some additional incentive-based compensation or renewed 
his contract at a higher compensation package at a time when the 
same could be said about the accuracy of HealthSouth's financial 
reporting. If the board might have been led to do so by a false sense 
of company performance, the same equitable remedy would 
seemingly apply-restitution of the tainted compensation. A recent 
decision also involving Scrushy by the Alabama Supreme Court, 
Scrushy v. Tucker,78 does precisely this, citing HealthSouth in 
support of requiring forfeiture of Scrushy's tainted bonuses: "As 
between Scrushy and HealthSouth, it would be unconscionable to 
allow Scrushy to retain millions of dollars awarded to him in the 
form of bonuses at the expense of the corporation he served as chief 
executive officer [of] and its shareholders.,,79 Here again, the court 
said that this result would be so even if Scrushy were entirely 
uninvolved in the misreporting.80 
With respect to compensation pursuant to contractual 
75. [d. at 1105. 
76. [d. at 1106. 
77. [d. at 1106-07. In a subsequent limited liability company case 
involving claims for damage liability rather than unjust enrichment, Vice 
Chancellor Strine indicated that notwithstanding HealthSouth, plaintiffs 
should have to show a breach of fiduciary duty by the company official to prevail 
against that official under an equitable fraud claim, lest the protections of the 
business judgment rule be too easily lost. Metro Commc'n. Corp. BVI v. 
Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 163 n.102 (Del. Ch. 2004). Ct 
Shamrock Holdings of Cal., Inc. v. Iger, No. CIV.A.1330-N, 2005 WL 1377490, 
at *7 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2005) (involving a claim for equitable relief). 
78. 955 So. 2d 988 (Ala. 2006). The presence of litigation involving Scrushy 
and HealthSouth in both Delaware and Alabama raises an interesting choice of 
law question-is the restitutionary alternative based on the internal affairs 
doctrine, so that the state of incorporation takes primacy--or can the state in 
which the tainted compensation was paid also plausibly assert subject matter 
jurisdiction as a matter of contract law? Given the contractual nature of 
compensation, it is hard to argue that only the state of incorporation has 
authority here. 
79. [d. at 1012. 
80. [d. 
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agreement between the executive and the company, the issues are 
pretty much the same. To the extent that the contract was made 
after the fraud began (even assuming the executive is unaware of it), 
it is entirely justifiable to employ contract formation defenses, such 
as mutual mistake or innocent misrepresentation, to set aside the 
contract and permit restitution by the issuer. One court, in Miller v. 
U.S. Foodservice, Inc.,8! casts doubt on whether this should be so, 
but in so doing seems to take an unnecessarily narrow view of the 
law of mistake. Miller suggests that the company (through the 
actions of the board of directors) assumes the risk that the financials 
might be misstated in contracting with the executive.82 But, where 
one party is better positioned to either spot or prevent the problem, 
that party is typically allocated the risk, and in the corporate 
context-as both HealthSouth and Scrushy emphasize-the CEO is 
the better-positioned party.83 Another concern raised in Miller is 
that the remedy seems draconian.84 But assuming that an executive 
had acted in good faith, this would not leave him out in the cold. 
Equity would give him an offsetting quasi-contractual claim against 
the company for the reasonable value of his services during the time 
in question, given the truth about the company's performance. 
However, the difference, the amount returned to the company and 
its shareholders, could still be considerable.85 The other contractual 
setting is where the contract predates the fraud. Here, the role for 
unjust enrichment in the absence of a showing of culpability is 
smaller, limited to those portions of the compensation that were 
determined or otherwise tainted by the inaccurate financial 
statements. 
The unjust enrichment approach seems so easy and 
straightforward that we might predict that these kinds of cases 
should become commonplace against executives after companies 
with which they are associated get caught up in scandal. Indeed, 
these cases are common, and ongoing litigation now regularly cites 
these cases in efforts to recoup. The recent options-backdating 
81. 361 F. Supp. 2d 470, 484-85 (D. Md. 2005) (doubting whether 
restitution should playa significant role where an unbreached contract exists 
between the executive and the company, notwithstanding severe corporate 
fraud). Miller should be read in light of its primary holding-that the CEO did 
breach his fiduciary duty and hence, was liable to the company for both 
restitution and damages on that ground. 
82. Id. at 484 n.13. 
83. On the law of mistake and avoidance in this setting where the executive 
is complicit, see DeMott, supra notes 62 and 65 (comparing U.S. and British 
cases); Catherine MacMillan, How Temptation Leads to Mistake: An 
Explanation of Bell v. Lever Brothers, 119 L.Q. REV. 625 (2003) (discussing a 
British case regarding the validity of a severance agreement made before the 
board was fully aware of the agents' self-dealing). 
84. Miller, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
85. Also, to the extent that the executive somehow lacked "clean hands," 
his offsetting recovery could be reduced or denied entirely. 
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scandals have been a particularly compelling opportunity to make 
unjust enrichment arguments. To the extent that HealthSouth and 
Scrushy are followed and extended, the state law trend would be 
important in assessing the law relating to individual as opposed to 
enterprise liability. So, we should turn to the obstacles to recovery 
in restitution. 
The incentives for derivative plaintiffs to bring the cases seem 
sufficient. A suit can be brought against the senior management 
team, which may include a sizable number of executives, and the 
aggregate amount of compensation subject to disgorgement should 
be large enough to justify the litigation risk and expenses, especially 
if state of mind (always the hardest issue) is not a necessary 
element.86 Recall that in HealthSouth, plaintiffs succeeded on a 
motion for summary judgment, not even needing to go to trial.87 To 
be sure, insurance coverage is not available with respect to an 
unjust enrichment claim, so that defendants might be highly 
motivated to defend their wealth aggressively.88 But the law still 
seems stacked against them. 
The more serious obstacles are twofold. One deals with 
contractability. In HealthSouth, Vice Chancellor Strine observed 
that there was no contractual impediment to the claim for 
restitution, because no contractual language addressed the matter 
in question (the loan forgiveness).89 Miller, by contrast, emphasized 
the presence of the compensation contract in saying the restitution 
had no place.90 Executives often negotiate detailed compensation 
contracts under circumstances that give them substantial leeway in 
extracting favorable terms.91 Such contracts not infrequently limit 
86. There can be questions in terms of personal jurisdiction over the 
individual defendants, although Delaware's recent change in the law makes it 
easier to sue high-ranking officers in Delaware court. There is always the 
option of suing in the jurisdiction where the company's principal offices are 
located, though that loses the expertise of the Delaware judiciary. 
87. In re HeathSouth Corp. S'holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1110 (Del. Ch. 
2003). 
88. Although such claims are outside the scope of the standard policy, one 
cannot simply assume that insurers would not be pressured to find some way to 
settle such cases within the scope of the policy. For concerns about the relative 
indifference of insurers to scope questions (particularly the "fraud" exclusion), 
see Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: 
The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1805 (2007). One 
problem is that issuers have in large numbers obtained insurance policies for 
their own liability, so that neither they nor the insurers have that much 
interest in the apportionment question. See id. at 1802-03; Coffee, supra note 
2, at 1569-70. 
89. HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1109 n.27. 
90. Miller v. U.S. Foodservice Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 470, 483 (D. Md. 2005). 
91. See Randall Thomas & Stewart Schwab, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 231, 241 (2006); David Yermack, Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay 
for Retired and Dismissed CEO's, 41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237,237-38 (2006). 
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the ability of the company to terminate executives' employment, 
except on a very stringent showing of cause, and trigger lucrative 
severance packages when a termination is without cause.92 One can 
imagine a provision that explicitly makes this the limited and 
exclusive remedy for the corporation in an effort to bar recapture of 
money already paid under the contract absent cause. Indeed, there 
are many contractual variations by which executives might seek to 
protect their compensation against the kind of remedy afforded the 
plaintiffs in HealthSouth and Scrushy. 
The general rule of contract law with respect to restitutionary 
remedies for breach is that they can be waived or revised ex ante, so 
long as the limitation is clearly stated and not unconscionable or 
otherwise in violation of public policy.93 This rule is subject to an 
overriding rule of some importance, however: that the contract 
containing the limitation not itself be tainted by fraud. 94 In another 
recent and somewhat controversial opinion by Vice Chancellor 
Strine involving a sale of business transaction, he held that the 
remedy of rescission and restitution was available to the plaintiffs 
even though the contract disclaimed such a remedy, because the 
fraud preceded the making of the contract and thus rendered the 
whole contract, including the disclaimer, unenforceable.95 To the 
extent that the start to the fraudulent scheme preceded the 
executive compensation contract, the same reasoning might well 
apply. The same would be true if the contract was tainted by some 
other procedural defect, for example, if the process by which it was 
negotiated involved a breach of fiduciary duty as a result of gross 
1· 96 neg 1gence. 
Assuming not, however, the question turns into one of public 
policy. Would a limitation of remedy clause essentially 
guaranteeing that an executive retains extraordinary compensation 
notwithstanding corporate wrongdoing be a violation of public 
92. See Charles Forelle & Mark Maremont, UnitedHealth's McGuire Could 
Leave with $1.1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2006, at Bl. According to this 
report, McGuire, who left UnitedHealth in connection with an options 
backdating scandal, had a contract that limited "cause" to either a felony 
conviction or a repeated failure to remedy a serious problem despite repeated 
notices demanding that it be cleaned up. [d.; see also Lublin & Thurm, supra 
note 5, at B1 (quoting one lawyer as saying that for a board to fire a CEO for 
cause, "you have to burn the building down or have major, major 
embezzlement"). On the policy issues raised by termination provisions 
generally, see Geof Stapledon, Termination Benefits for Executives of Australian 
Companies, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 683, 683 (2005) (surveying U.S., U.K., and 
Australian authorities and guidance regarding termination payments). 
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (1981) 
(recognizing the rights of parties to revise and limit contractual remedies). 
94. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition L.L.C., 891 A.2d 1032, 1048 
n.26 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
95. [d. at 1064. 
96. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
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policy? The answer would seem to depend on the executive's 
behavior. If the executive was complicit in the fraud and acted in 
bad faith, the retention of benefits would offend any number of basic 
principles of corporation law. An ultra-narrow definition of cause or 
limited remedy provision that essentially immunizes the executive 
from restitutionary liability for breach of fiduciary duty encourages 
breach without offering any offsetting justification (risk allocation, 
etc.). A useful analogy here might be to the law of indemnification, 
which bars the company from reimbursing officers and directors for 
fines, judgments, or expenses, unless the board finds that the party 
seeking reimbursement acted in good faith and in a manner 
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the company. By 
most accounts, this bar cannot be overridden by contract.97 A 
contractual override of basic restitutionary principles operates 
almost identically, and is equally suspect. Arguably, one might 
extend this principle beyond bad faith to conduct in good faith, but 
that could not reasonably be thought to be in the company's best 
interests, which might include recklessness or gross negligence. On 
the other hand, it would be harder to strike down on public policy 
grounds a limitation on restitution with respect to innocent or 
simply negligent conduct. This is more properly a matter of risk 
allocation, and Delaware's presumption of free contractability 
regarding the terms and conditions for executive employment is 
probably strong enough to protect a clause such as this. This is 
significant, however, because this kind of contractual limitation 
would alter the incentive structure for litigation-to the extent that 
plaintiffs are forced to show bad faith or something equivalent to get 
around the limitations on remedies, their case is more difficult and 
risky. We could expect fewer such suits, then, to the extent that 
aggressive contractual protection became commonplace. 
But there may be an even larger hurdle if the corporation's 
independent directors choose not to seek full restitution against the 
executive and recommend termination of the derivative suit as a 
matter of business judgment. This gets us into a subject well 
beyond the scope of this Article. A board might be protective of a 
senior officer whom they decided not to terminate notwithstanding 
the scandal, although this is increasingly less common given public 
relations concerns and enforcement pressure. More likely, at least 
97. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 
1996) (construing Delaware law regarding indemnification); see also E. Norman 
Veasey et aI., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited 
Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399,412 (1987). In In re 
Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation, the court rejected a claim that a settlement 
excluding individual liability operated as impermissible indemnification. 264 
F.3d 284, 301 (3d Cir. 2001). My argument here is different: that an actual 
payment by the company pursuant to contract should, by analogy, be deemed 
against public policy if it had the effect of enriching the defendant 
notwithstanding bad faith or lack of corporate best interests. 
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some senior officials will be terminated regardless of evidence of 
complicity, assuming the scandal is serious enough. However, the 
termination will often be on mutually agreeable terms that leave the 
executive with a large severance package, in essence protecting the 
wealth created during the period in question. There are many 
reasons why this might be: loyalty or sympathy for the executive 
who has been forced out because of media, investor, or regulatory 
pressure is one possibility; the more likely reason is to avoid the 
expensive, messy publicity and liability risk associated with 
litigation against the executive over whether the termination was 
permissible, who else was at fault, and so on. 
Assuming that demand is not excused or the special litigation 
committee is composed of sufficiently independent directors, there 
are significant, though not necessarily insuperable, hurdles. In 
terms of the thoroughness of the investigatory process, one 
interesting question is whether the reviewing directors were 
sufficiently aware of" and considered the potency of the 
restitutionary remedies that cases like HealthSouth afford the 
corporation, so that if it was foregone, they could plausibly explain 
why. (In a demand-excused case, this would be an explicit 
inquiry.)98 A conclusion, after thorough investigation, that litigation 
against the executive would be difficult, risky, and 
counterproductive to the corporation's need to "move forward" from 
its troubles would probably receive deference. But if the Delaware 
chancery judges were so inclined, they could breathe more life into 
the restitutionary threat by taking a hard look at cases where the 
board allows an executive to walk away substantially enriched, 
notwithstanding plausible allegations of misconduct.99 
In sum, Delaware law affords the corporation considerable 
ability to seek rescission and restitution for breach of contract in the 
form of breach of fiduciary duty, thereby putting the individual 
executives at risk with respect to their incentive compensation. But 
there are practical questions about the incentive structure for 
aggressively pursuing equitable remedies via a derivative suit. So, 
while this is potentially fertile ground for remedial action against 
individual executives complicit in (or benefiting from) fraud, 
Delaware law requires further articulation to see just how great the 
potential really is, and in the absence of evidence that the Delaware 
chancery judges will encourage efforts to seek disgorgement, the 
more likely remedies will be federal, not state remedies. 
98. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
99. In Desimone u. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 950-51 (Del. Ch. 2007), Vice 
Chancellor Strine refused to consider evidence that the directors in a stock 
options backdating case had not been aggressive enough in pursuing the 
individuals accused of wrongdoing in assessing whether demand is required or 
excused. 
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IV. FEDERAL LAW 
A. Private Lawsuits 
Corporate liability is a derivative of individual liability; by and 
large (with a few exceptions), courts have rejected the idea that 
there can be enterprise liability under Rule 10b-5 without a showing 
that at least one natural person acting within the scope of his or her 
authority was primarily liable. loo In that sense, individual executive 
liability is the starting point under federal law, and the key issues 
in private litigation focus on executive culpability. For our 
purposes, that means that sanctioning individuals upon a 
determination of culpability should be fairly straightforward. 
There are, however, notorious obstacles even if we assume that 
plaintiffs can demonstrate materially false statements or omissions. 
Cases under Rule 10b-5 require a showing of scienter (knowledge or 
recklessness), and Congress has made bringing a case more difficult 
by requiring a showing by the plaintiff of facts giving rise to a strong 
inference of scienter before discovery can begin. IOI Courts recently 
have become much stricter in requiring plaintiffs to make this 
showing with respect to each individual executive charged with 
responsibility, rejecting "group pleading" efforts to assert that 
executives are presumed to know what other members of the control 
group knoW. I02 This difficulty is avoided if the company made a 
registered public offering of securities during the time of the 
misconduct with respect to executives who signed the registration 
statement, because Section 11 lawsuits under the Securities Act 
merely require a showing of lack of due diligence on the executive's 
part. 103 Also a potential obstacle is the requirement that any person 
sued under Rule 10b-5 in a private lawsuit be a "primary" violator.lo4 
In some circuits, this requirement means that the filing or publicity 
alleged to be fraudulent must identify the individual as at least 
partly responsible for its production, so that behind-the-scenes 
100. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
101. See William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under 
Section 21D(B)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, 
and Recklessness and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 896 (1996). This requirement was analyzed by the 
Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 
(2007). 
102. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 
365 (5th Cir. 2004); William O. Fisher, Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie: 
The Rise and Possible Demise of the "Group Pleading" Protocol in 10b-5 Cases, 
56 Bus. LAW. 991, 1049-53 (2001). 
103. Section 11, however, limits non-director executive liability to the 
signatories of the registration statement, thus excluding most of the senior 
management team. 
104. See Fisher, supra note 102, at 1031-33. 
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actors escape liability. !Os This result may narrow the number of 
executives against whom the action can be brought, although CEOs 
and CFOs are less likely to gain much benefit here because 
signature and (after Sarbanes-Oxley) certification requirements 
create the necessary attribution with respect to SEC filings. lOG 
Lesser senior executives plainly benefit from this line of case law. 
On the other hand, the benefit may be partially overcome to the 
extent that plaintiffs persuade the court that those executives are 
part of the control group of the corporation, which makes them 
presumptively liable unless they acted in good faith and did not 
directly or indirectly induce the violation. lo7 
A third factor in restricting individual executive liability 
exposure is another product of Congress's reforms in 1995, 
proportionate liability. To the extent that a defendant acted without 
actual knowledge of the fraud in a Rule 10b-5 case, joint and several 
liability is replaced by proportionate fault, wherein the jury 
apportions to the individual only his share of liability. lOB In a case 
where a large number of persons may have contributed to the fraud, 
this can bring down individual liability exposure considerably. With 
respect to company executives, proportionate liability does not apply 
in Section 11 cases. 
Finally, many courts say that the plaintiffs case must allege 
something more than mere "corporate mismanagement" against the 
executives. 109 This requirement is not a problem when the 
misconduct operates as a fraud on purchasers or sellers of company 
stock by concealing financially material information, and hence does 
not apply to accounting scandals. But reckless or disloyal 
managerial behavior can sometimes be hard to reach under this line 
of cases if not part of some scheme, the exposure of which caused a 
significant drop in the price of the company's stock. 
Each of the foregoing examples is significant, but not enough 
that we can say that dishonest executives readily escape liability as 
a matter of law when there is a significant scandal at the company. 
Proving that there was in fact a scandal and that any particular 
executive was dishonest can be hard, but that is not my main 
concern. Again, proving the scandal and the involvement of at least 
one executive in its perpetration is normally essential to creating 
enterprise liability as well. 
Instead, the explanation for why settlements in securities 
105. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1995); 
SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 70S, 720, 723-24 (D.N.J. 2005). 
106. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.15d-14 (2006); see Lisa Fairfax, Form Over 
Substance? Official Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal 
Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 13-15, lS-
20 (2002). 
107. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7S(t)(u) (2000). 
lOS. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 7Su-3 (2000). 
109. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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actions tend to neglect individual executive responsibility is one of 
negotiation dynamics. Plaintiffs want the largest sum of money 
possible, with-until recently in some high profile cases 11°-little 
care about who was funding it. Because it comes out of their 
pockets, the individual defendants can be expected to resist personal 
liability more strongly than the board of directors will resist 
corporate payment (the board is also aware that amounts paid by 
executives in a class action settlement may trigger indemnification 
rights anyway). And both the company and executives will seek 
substantial participation in the settlement from the D&O insurers, 
who appear to be quite willing to participate as long as settlement 
patterns are predictable enough that the costs can be passed on in 
the form of higher premiums, even though fraud is contractually 
outside the scope of coverage. lll Hence, the result mentioned earlier: 
nearly the entire settlement funding tends to come from the 
company and the insurers.ll2 Individuals are largely ignored, 
however culpable. Concern about unjust enrichment has not been a 
significant factor in the resolution of fraud-on-the-market cases. 
That may be changing, of course, as plaintiffs' lawyers recognize 
the risk that investors will come to realize the extent to which they 
fund the system almost entirely. Again, there is nothing more than 
difficulty and expense standing in the way of greater individual 
liability once the underlying fraud is proved, and the difficulty and 
expense is not preclusive. But it probably does require plaintiffs 
and their lawyers to act against short-term self-interest by turning 
down settlement offers that shift responsibility away from the 
individuals, and that is not something we can predict will happen 
consistently. 
The interesting question is how plaintiffs' behavior would 
change if we abolished or significantly curtailed enterprise liability, 
leaving only (or mainly) insurance money and the individual 
executives' assets on the table. The answer is far from clear. It 
might be, as we observe in other settings such as medical 
malpractice, that insurance would become the sole source of 
funding, which in turn might create a game of chicken regarding the 
size of corporate D&O insurance policies. Moreover, to the extent 
that individual assets became more of the target, individual 
executives could be expected to engage in more aggressive asset 
protection strategies, raising the cost and risk associated with 
reaching those assets, and to insist on very strong litigation defense, 
110. See, e.g., Bernard Black et aI., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 1055, 1057-58 (2006); Brooke A. Masters & Kathleen Day, 10 Ex-
WorldCom Directors Agree to Settlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at El. 
111. See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 1629, 1644-48 (1994). 
112. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. On the insurance problems, 
see Baker & Griffith, supra note 88, at 1820; Syverud, supra note 111, at 1634-
35. 
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which is, at least in the first instance, at company expense. 
Either of these outcomes might simply reduce the number of 
private lawsuits (meritorious as well as nonmeritorious) without 
producing many benefits in terms of compensation or deterrence.113 
On the other hand, it could create sufficient incentive so that more 
resources would be directed at individual involvement in the fraud. 
We observe a steady stream of private lawsuits brought under 
Section 16(b) against executives and large shareholders for 
disgorgement of short-swing insider trading profits, for example, 
even though there is neither insurance nor enterprise liability. 
Admittedly, however, Section 16(b) cases are easier to prove than 
Rule 10b-5 violations. 
B. SEC Enforcement 
The SEC avoids many of the restrictions imposed on private 
litigants in fraud actions involving company executives. The 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's ("PSLRA") heightened 
pleading standard does not apply to SEC enforcement actions; 
indeed, the SEC can avoid having to prove scienter if it is likely to 
be troublesome by charging the executive with liability under 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, which permits negligence-based 
actions. 114 Nor does it have to worry excessively about the "primary" 
liability case law, because it can bring actions against aiders and 
abettors. 115 The SEC does not have to prove losses either, or be 
concerned about proportionate liability limitations. 
So far as substantive law is concerned, in fact, what is 
remarkable is the breadth of the SEC's ability to reach individual 
corporate executives. It is by no means just a matter of antifraud 
liability under Rule lOb-5 or Section 17(a), but a host of specific 
rules that reach deeply inside the corporation. For example, Rule 
13b2-2 bars not only direct efforts to mislead accountants, but also 
actions to "coerce, manipulate. . . or fraudulently influence" them 
with respect to material financial reporting matters.116 Also, any 
false or misleading record that an executive puts into the accounting 
system violates Rule 13b2-1.!17 
Where fraud is alleged, the law's scope is extensive as well. 
There is no question of the law's ability to reach executives' 
participation in any fraud influencing the investing public, but as I 
have described elsewhere, even intra-company frauds are likely 
113. There is evidence that the expected value necessary for plaintiffs' 
lawyers to bring a class action suit has gone up in recent years, reflecting the 
increasing cost and difficulty of succeeding. See Choi & Thompson, supra note 
9, at 1497. 
114. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,695-97 (1980). 
115. See SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d 703, 723-24 (D.N.J. 
2005). 
116. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2006). 
117. Id. § 240. 13b2-1. 
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subject to sanction. liS If a senior executive omits material 
information in a presentation to the board of directors, that is 
considered securities fraud so long as it has the requisite connection 
to the purchase or sale of securities. For example, board grants of 
options-based compensation certainly satisfy that standard, so that 
if there is a causal link between the two (e.g., the presentation 
created a misleadingly favorable impression that influenced the 
compensation decision), the SEC could charge the executive with 
fraud. 119 It is hard to imagine many forms of executive dishonesty 
that the Commission could not reach as a matter of law. 
The Commission's remedial tools are extensive as well, 
including the ability to seek civil penalties with respect to the 
violation of any provision or rule, the ability to gain disgorgement of 
any gains or profits tainted by a violation, and a bar against officers 
from continued employment in that role at a public company if the 
violation demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve. 120 Two 
provisions added by Sarbanes-Oxley underscore the SEC's ability to 
reach ill-gotten gains. One is the ability to seek a temporary freeze 
authority over extraordinary payments that the issuer is about to 
pay to company executives. 121 The other requires the forfeiture by 
the CEO and CFO of any bonuses and other incentive compensation, 
plus profits from the sale of securities when the issuer restates its 
financials because of "material noncompliance... as a result of 
misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the 
securities laws.,,122 A plain reading of the statute does not require 
that the misconduct be the fault of the CEO or CFO, so that 
executives are at risk simply from being in charge when accounting 
problems occur due to someone's misconduct. This latter provision 
is potentially even more potent than the principle announced in 
HealthSouth under Delaware law, because there is no requirement 
118. See Langevoort, Agency Law, supra note 20, at 1208-10; see also 
Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under 
Rule lOb-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1656-57 (2004). 
119. This example is of significance in the recent flurry of enforcement 
activity charging company officials with options backdating and so-called 
"spring-loading." Where the board is left in the dark, liability should follow; 
questions are much harder-requiring some sort of theory relating to 
misrepresentation of executive compensation-if the board is aware of the 
insiders' benefit. 
120. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
817-20 (5th ed. 2006). 
121. See SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §304, 116 Stat. 745, 
778 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2005». On private 
enforcement of this provision, see infra notes 132 and 143 and accompanying 
text. For an argument that personal wrongdoing should be required, see John 
P. Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a Personal 
Culpability Requirement, 59 Bus. LAW. 1005 (2004). 
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that the compensation specifically be tied to assumptions about the 
accuracy of the company's financials or its share price, and because 
it reaches even trading profits made in transactions with third 
parties. 
Given this substantive and remedial breadth, the SEC has the 
power to leave dishonest company executives "naked, homeless and 
without wheels," but often the SEC does not, choosing instead to 
settle cases without impressive sanctions against the individuals 
involved,123 leaving the suspicion that executives may have walked 
away from the settlement table with substantial wealth still in their 
pockets. This pattern is changing, but it is still worth asking why 
the Commission might tradeoff sanctions against the company for 
aggressively sanctioning the individuals. To a large extent, the 
answer likely mirrors the dynamics in the settlement of private 
securities litigation. The SEC has too few resources for all the work 
it is asked to do, and hence seeks settlement rather than continued 
litigation of its enforcement actions. It is easier to get a board of 
directors to accept a penalty against the company than it is to get 
individuals to agree to painful personal sanctions. The corporate 
sanction avoids the need to attribute fault to any particular 
individual under circumstances where there is likely mutual finger 
pointing about who is to blame. For all these reasons, company 
sanctions are the path of least resistance; the SEC can claim its 
victory and move its resources to new matters that deserve 
attention. There is probably a publicity-related reason as well: 
sanctions against companies can be large enough to grab headlines, 
which is less likely to occur with respect to individual sanctions, 
even in the aggregate. 
The problem of limited resources affects not only the disposition 
of cases actually brought by the SEC, but also means that there will 
probably be many matters that the SEC would investigate if it had 
the available staff, but simply cannot. This concern over shortage of 
resources is the standard argument for supplementing SEC 
enforcement with private rights of action under the securities 
laws. 124 Deterrence against individual executives is less than it 
should be if the SEC must forego promising enforcement actions, 
regardless of its position with respect to individual versus enterprise 
liability. 
v. POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT 
As noted earlier, the impulse to use enterprise liability as a tool 
123. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1536-37. 
124. But see James D. Cox & Randall Thomas (with Dana Kiku), Public and 
Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since 
Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 897 (2004) (expressing concern that many 
private actions piggyback on SEC investigations, raising the question of 
whether they really provide a useful supplement). 
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is a response to the challenges associated with individual liability. 
These are daunting problems that do not easily disappear, even if 
deterrence rather than compensation is made the primary goal. 
Indemnification, insurance, and asset protection strategies may 
reduce the pain that the individual executive feels from a sanction 
ex post. There are also the practical problems of assessing 
individual executive culpability in complex organizations with 
diffused lines of authority and the fear that if the liability system is 
made draconian, it will either induce excess caution or lead to 
demands for greater compensation ex ante for the risk ofliability. 
A focus on unjust enrichment avoids some of these problems, 
but not all. It also naturally invites the objection that it is too little 
a threat-that given the problems with detection and litigation 
incentives, the optimal penalty has to exceed the amount of the gain 
in order to deter efficiently. I agree and would want the system to 
create more of a liability threat than simply disgorgement. Keep in 
mind, however, that executives do face significant threats in 
addition to this possibility of disgorgement: harm to reputation and 
livelihood can be considerable;125 the SEC can always impose 
penalties and an officer/director bar in addition to disgorgement 
remedies;126 and the threat of criminal prosecution with severe jail 
sentences is always present. 
That notwithstanding, I want to turn to some other possibilities 
for making changes in the legal landscape that might improve the 
probability that executives caught up in misconduct will lose the 
wealth gained from being in control during the time of the fraud. 
A. Incentives in Private Litigation 
Plaintiffs' lawyers act in an economically rational fashion: they 
pursue cases that generate the largest net gains, preferably in 
settlement rather than costly litigation. This tendency produces a 
bias toward pursuing D&O insurance coverage and enterprise 
liability, because pay-out decisions are not made by those paying out 
of their own pockets. 
Jack Coffee has made the useful suggestion that this bias be 
countered by adjusting attorneys' fees in settled and litigated 
125. See Hemang Desai et aI., The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive 
Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Managerial Turnover, 81 ACCT. REV. 
83, 85 (2006) (reporting that turnover of a high ranking official after a 
restatement is approximately 60%, compared to 35% when there is no such 
restatement); Karpoff, supra note 42, at 2. Earlier work largely doubted that 
there was much turnover effect. See Anup Agrawal et aI., Management 
Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 309, 339 (1999). It is possible that recent changes-including the policies 
of the Justice Department and the SEC to credit companies ifthey have reacted 
aggressively to the allegations of fraud and cooperated with investigators-have 
made terminations more commonplace. 
126. See Karpoff, supra note 6, at 32-33. 
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actions so that the lawyers would recover a greater percentage or 
amount to the extent that the money was paid by individual 
wrongdoers. 127 The question, of course, is how much greater the 
bounty payment needs to be to cause a shift? Too great a percentage 
becomes at least politically troubling to the extent that it shifts more 
money from defendant to plaintiffs' lawyer, skipping the supposed 
victims, and tempting a greater number of suits to be brought for 
their settlement value. At the very least, courts approving 
settlements would have to be more careful (and work harder) in this 
setting. 
Too small an additional percentage, on the other hand, might 
leave the lawyers preferring to take advantage of the gross liability 
threat to the corporation as their main leverage in settlement talks. 
I have suggested elsewhere that corporate liability be capped, both 
to bring damage liability closer to the optimal and in order to 
eliminate this excessive leverage. 128 The hard question is whether 
such caps would leave in place enough incentive for lawyers to bring 
meritorious lawsuits. My sense is that the caps could be set in a 
way that would. Additionally, if a bounty were then added for 
uninsured and unindemnified recoveries against wrongdoing 
executives, there would be substantial incentive to exceed the 
company-funded baseline, notwithstanding the costs. 
Without necessarily endorsing it as a reform, one could at least 
imagine abandoning the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance in cases involving nontrading issuers129-the key to class 
actions seeking recovery for corporate fraud-and still retain room 
for deterrence and restitution. Such a change would eliminate class 
actions as a remedial device, but still permit large shareholders to 
bring suit for fraud, either under Rule 1Ob-5, or, in a case involving 
false filings with the SEC, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange 
Act. In such an action, it would be fairly easy (and perhaps already 
so as a matter of law)130 to allow restitution as an ancillary remedy 
on top of whatever actual damages the plaintiffs can show, again 
with an attorney's fee bounty for successful recovery against 
company officers. The remainder of the restitutionary amount 
127. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1581-82. 
128. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 657-60. 
129. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245, 250 (1988) (holding that 
in fraud-on-the-market cases, reliance is a rebuttable presumption). For such a 
proposal, see Mahoney, supra note 23, at 670; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 
1582-84. On the difficulties for the fraud-on-the-market theory if one assumes 
some degree of investor irrationality in the setting of stock prices, see 
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 137; Ribstein, supra note 8, at 139-40. 
130. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287-90 (1940) 
(noting that the Securities Act does not restrict relief under its provisions to 
monetary judgments). Also worth remembering is Section 29(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which renders contracts made in violation of the Act 
voidable. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc; see COX ET AL., 
supra note 120, at 782-89. 
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would then be returned to the corporation or transferred to the SEC, 
as the court directs. 
B. Director Accountability 
As a matter of state corporate law, directors are well positioned 
to recoup ill-gotten gains from executives who have been unjustly 
enriched by their activities; the question is whether they have the 
motivation and incentive to do so. One way of turning up the 
pressure is to hold the directors more accountable for their 
decisions. Coffee suggests that the SEC require-in the event of 
settlement of private securities litigation-a filed statement from 
the board of directors as to the fairness of the settlement in light of 
concerns that money simply paid by the company or its insurance 
carrier hurts, rather than helps, shareholders. 131 This change, too, 
would be helpful, though its benefits might be small in the 
predictable situation where the board denies widespread individual 
executive culpability in favor of a few "rotten apples," or largely 
denies wrongdoing altogether and claims that settlement is simply 
to avoid the costs and burdens of further litigation. 
Further leverage here could come from the SEC. One of the 
factors on its list of whether to penalize a company is the extent of 
its "remediation" efforts,132 a vague term that encompasses many 
possible board responses to what has been uncovered. The SEC 
could require a commitment from the company that it will seek 
appropriate restitution from all identifiable wrongdoers and "defer" 
enforcement action against the company pending its effort to do so. 
The board would report periodically to the SEC on its progress and 
receive approval with respect to the settlement or termination of 
any action against the executives in question. This requirement 
would also conserve SEC resources, addressing another factor that 
sometimes leads to a preference for entity, rather than individual, 
liability. 
c. Derivative Suits 
As just noted, state law holds some promise as a source of 
restitutionary recovery against executives.133 Because of the dearth 
131. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1577 (citing In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. 
Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (questioning settlements that leave out 
individual defendant liability». I will leave to the side the question of whether 
outside directors should bear greater personal liability for failures of oversight. 
To date, the risk of outside director liability-putting aside the context of a 
public offering of securities-is almost nil. See Black et aI., supra note 110, at 
1062. 
132. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. On remediation in SEC 
settlements, see generally Cristie Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities 
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 785 (2005) (suggesting that negotiated 
compliance and monitoring efforts will produce more law-abiding behavior). 
133. Booth's suggestion is to concentrate on the derivative action as the 
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of case law, however, the law is less clear than it might be about the 
liability of executives who are somehow complicit in financial 
misreporting. One can glean from HealthSouth a basis for 
rescission and restitution of incentive compensation contracts, albeit 
with interesting open questions remaining about contractual 
limitations on such remedies. It would be helpful to have guidance 
on the validity of clauses that seek to protect compensation 
notwithstanding breach of fiduciary duty. If the law was clearer, 
director accountability would be enhanced as well because directors 
making "business judgment" decisions on how to proceed would then 
be expected to address the restitutionary option in justifying their 
actions. 
Indeed, Delaware law could benefit from more clarity on a 
number of issues relating to executive responsibility with respect to 
financial reporting. Malone v. Brincat stands for the proposition 
that officers and directors are responsible for candid disclosure to 
shareholders, whether or not shareholder action is sought. 134 
However, purportedly so as not to conflict with the federal law that 
fills the field, this duty of candor is limited in cases that do not 
involve requests for shareholder action to intentional 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure where there is a duty to speak 
and requires a showing of individualized reliance (i.e., not a fraud-
on-the-market-type presumption),135 making these cases unsuited for 
class action treatment. In a case decided shortly after HealthSouth, 
Vice Chancellor Strine indicated that equitable doctrines, such as 
constructive fraud, should not be expanded in ways that would 
undercut the Malone limitations, and he resisted treating 
HealthSouth as an invitation for no-fault or negligence liability 
under the duty of candor. 136 
That point is well taken, though the concern is probably 
overstated. The duty of candor issue in the absence of shareholder 
action does overlap with a well-developed (and now more tightly 
controlled) class action regime under federal law, which is about the 
recovery of damages by open-market traders. The issue I have been 
stressing is the executive's obligation of candor to the corporation, 
which is most clearly embodied in an affirmative duty of candor vis-
a-vis the company's board of directors and remediable via an action 
by or derivatively in the name of the corporation. This is clearly a 
state law issue, though again it is surprising that one finds so little 
Delaware law dealing with "candor inside the corporation.,,137 More 
mechanism for sanctioning corporate executives. See Booth, supra note 8, at 
22-25. 
134. 722 A.2d 5, 12-13 (Del. 1998). 
135. Id. at II. 
136. See Metro Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecom Techs. Inc., 854 
A.2d 121, 163 n.102 (Del. Ch. 2004). For further discussion of Metro 
Communication, see supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
137. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1198-99. 
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importantly, claims of unjust enrichment brought by, or on behalf of, 
the corporation are of the sort where neither fault nor reliance have 
ever been required elements. 13B A flourishing body of law on 
recouping incentive compensation would not, therefore, contravene 
any significant Malone-type policies, regardless of whether one 
treats the issue as fraud on the board or fraud on the shareholders. 
Quite to the contrary, it would reinforce the body of law implicit in 
Delaware jurisprudence that contracts tainted in their making or 
performance by breach of fiduciary duty are voidable. 
Indeed, there is probably room in Delaware law for greater 
recognition of the distinction between claims for equitable relief and 
claims for damages in terms of liability standards generally. 
Consider the recent Disney litigation. 139 Insofar as that case was an 
effort to impose damage liability on Disney's directors for their 
supposed bad faith in the process by which Michael Ovitz's contract 
was negotiated or terminated, plaintiffs properly faced a difficult 
burden, which they failed to satisfy.140 But suppose the case was 
restyled so that it was simply an effort to rescind Ovitz's contract or 
cancel the termination and recoup the severance. Here, bad faith 
would become unimportant-the plaintiffs only used that label in an 
effort to avoid the exculpation provision in Disney's charter. 
Delaware's exculpation authority only goes to claims for damages 
against directors and specifically excludes cases of improper 
personal benefit. It seems likely that a third party could not enforce 
a contract with the corporation which he knew was made in breach 
of fiduciary duty by the company's directors. 14l Arguably, that would 
include awareness of gross negligence on the part of the directors or 
circumstances where the third party knew that material 
information had wrongfully been concealed from the board. As a 
matter of simple equity, rescission could be warranted-albeit with 
a countervailing quantum meruit claim for fair value of services-
upon any factual showing that would defeat the apparent authority 
of those who negotiated the contract to act on the company's behalf. 
My point here is not to say that Disney would or should have 
come out differently (in the end, there was no finding of gross 
negligence), but simply to show that if it were pursued as a 
rescission and restitution case, rather than one against the directors 
for damages, it would look somewhat different. This is a fruitful 
area for further Delaware litigation. 
138. See generally In re HealthSouth S'holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1105 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (indicating the elements of an unjust enrichment claim). 
139. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (holding that the board of directors did not breach 
a duty of good faith by hiring and shortly thereafter terminating an employee 
with a generous termination package). 
140. Id. at 772. 
141. See In re Paramount Commc'ns Inc. S'holders Litig., 637 A.2d 34, 50-51 
(Del. 1994). 
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D. TheSEC 
The SEC has clear-cut authority to seek both restitution and 
civil penalties against wrongdoing executives, plus forward-looking 
relief in the form of injunctions, cease and desist orders, and 
officer/director bars. 142 The question here is simply one of 
probability of detection and institutional will, which in turn is 
driven by the Commission's limited resources coupled with some 
degree of litigation risk-aversion. 
There would be some benefit from a clearer articulation of SEC 
policy on individual responsibility in cases of financial misconduct. 
Of particular interest here would be a statement of when and how 
Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley143-requiring repayment of incentive 
compensation and insider trading profits by CEOs and CFOs when 
there has been an accounting restatement based on "misconduct"-
will be enforced. Courts have largely said that there is no implied 
private right of action. l44 If this is so, then external enforcement 
responsibility (coupled with exemptive authority) is given solely to 
the Commission. It would help to have a strong message about the 
facts and circumstances that make it appropriate or not to have 
such payments and the expectations as to the board's role in 
demanding disgorgement. As noted earlier, this can be done as part 
of an enforcement action wherein the Commiss~on chooses not to 
penalize the company so long as it commits to seeking restitution 
from all complicit insiders. Because the natural form of resistance 
on the part of company managers will be to resist restatements (or 
at least restatements that might be characterized as involving 
misconduct), the Commission should also look to bring cases against 
both managers and auditors where companies apparently avoided 
restating in order not to trigger Section 304. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Corporate managers have much to fear if they are complicit in 
accounting fraud even under the system as currently structured, 
where enterprise liability crowds out adequate attention to 
individual liability. Many lose their jobs and their reputations, face 
the risk of criminal prosecution, and, perhaps, share with other 
investors the loss in the value of their company's stock and options 
that comes when the fraud is uncovered. That executives continue 
to partake in fraud notwithstanding this threat is either because of 
142. Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., & Ira L. Brandriss, Staff Attorney, 
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, The Advantages of a Dual System: Parallel Streams of 
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws (Sept. 19, 1998), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspeecharchive/1998/spch222.htm. 
143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §304, 116 Stat. 745, 
778 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2005)). 
144. In re Bisys Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648,657 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
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the extraordinary gains that come from pulling off a deception or the 
ability of the human mind-and organizational culture-to blind a 
person to palpable risks. It is probably a bit of both. Either way, we 
should be cautious about assuming that tweaking the individual 
liability system will necessarily produce better deterrence. 
That said, it still strikes me as something of a baseline for the 
legitimacy of our corporate law system that remedies not leave 
executives who either instigated, helped execute, acquiesced in, or 
closed their eyes to fraud with most or all the wealth that was 
generated by the deception. It is all the worse ii we have created a 
system of liability that garners support only because of the illusion 
that it deters wrongdoing, but in fact mainly just moves money from 
the pockets of some investors to those of others, at substantial cost. 
The latter should be reformed in any event, but it would be a 
shame if the relatively small amount of deterrence and 
compensation offered by the current litigation regime were to be 
eliminated without careful attention to the problem of individual 
executive responsibility. We should admit, of course-as Vik 
Khanna has argued in the criminal contexe45-that as a matter of 
politics, the current emphasis on enterprise liability might exist 
precisely because. it provides cover for the protection of executive 
wealth. If so, it is naIve to expect that the system will change easily. 
At least, however, we should remove the cover and see what 
happens. 
145. See generally Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A 
Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 140 (2004). 
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